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 ‘Fantasies of Consensus:’i  Planning Reform in Sydney, 2005-2013 
Abstract 
This paper examines the battle to reform and streamline the planning system in Sydney, Australia, 
between 2005 and 2013. It analyses the strategies the State of NSW has pursued to manage ongoing 
conflicts over development, and reflects on the challenges the State has encountered in its attempt 
to redefine democratic engagement, justify decisions, claim legitimacy, and forge a consensus 
around a more pro-development planning system. While New South Wales’ planning reform 
strategies have pursued an apparently ‘post-political’ agenda (Swyngedouw 2010), using policy 
solutions to depoliticise difficult decisions, the reform process has exacerbated rather than defused 
conflicts. The story raises questions about the extent to which the new governing strategies of a 
post-political era can offer effective forums to forge consensus, or to stage-manage agreement over 
metropolitan development conflicts.   
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Planning must, increasingly, do more with less:  encourage economic development and 
accommodate population growth, while also limiting state spending, responding to a diverse set of 
social needs, and reducing environmental impacts. New approaches to planning attempt to resolve 
these conflicts by developing consensus-based decision processes, to defuse the conflicts that hard 
choices precipitate. Decision making must incorporate private as well as public and community 
sectors, and thus increasingly relies on bargaining and negotiation rather than the exercise of clear 
lines of bureaucratic authority. In this sense, theorists argue that planning has entered a post-
political era, where public decision making aims at forging (or imposing) consensus rather than 
addressing conflicts (Swyngedouw 2010; Allmendiger and Haughton 2012; Inch 2012).   
This paper examines the complex multifaceted problem posed by the battle to reform and 
streamline the intensely bureaucratic (and also highly democratic) planning system in Sydney, 
Australia. It analyses the strategies the State of NSW has pursued to manage ongoing conflicts over 
development, and reflects on the challenges the State has encountered in its attempt to redefine 
democratic engagement, justify an economic growth agenda, claim legitimacy, and forge a 
consensus around a more pro-development planning system. The case is interesting because it 
highlights the difficulty of driving change when legitimacy is questionable, and the equal difficulty 
the State has faced in managing a permeable and dynamic political environment with multiple vocal 
stakeholders. While NSW’s planning reform strategies have pursued a post-political agenda, using 
policy solutions to depoliticise difficult decisions, the reform process has exacerbated rather than 
defused conflicts. The story raises questions about the extent to which the new governing strategies 
of a post-political era can offer effective forums to forge consensus, or to stage-manage agreement 
over development conflicts.  
Sydney has been engaged in a continuous process of “planning reform” since 2005, under both 
Labor and Liberal-National Coalition governments (Freestone and Williams 2012). The reform 
process has been framed around resolving increasingly intense conflicts over densification and 
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redevelopment, which were played out in a planning system which gave considerable veto power to 
local governments and to the neighbours of development sites. Initially, the State attempted to 
resolve these conflicts by concentrating decision making power in the hands of the Minister for 
Planning (advised by the independent Planning Assessment Commission), and by appointing expert 
panels to depoliticise local planning decisions by taking them out of the hands of elected Councils 
(McFarland 2011; Freestone and Williams 2012). These efforts precipitated significant opposition, 
and a second era of planning reforms attempted to streamline development by negotiating 
agreement on the need to redefine the role of citizen participation, of experts and expert systems, 
and the ultimate goal of planning regulation. But these post-political strategies failed to forge 
consensus or to still conflict. Conflicts focused around fundamental questions about the appropriate 
extent and role of local democracy, the purpose of the planning system, and around the legitimacy 
of the State’s attempts to deregulate development. Sydney’s story of planning reform thus offers an 
interesting perspective on the post-political condition in planning, echoing questions raised 
elsewhere about the extent to which governments can successfully defuse political opposition (Inch 
2012; Allmendiger and Haughton 2011; 2013; Deas 2013).    
 The paper addresses three principal questions:  
• What are the major conflicts over development and the planning process in Sydney?  
• How did planning reform proposals during the period 2005 to 2013 attempt to defuse 
conflict?  
• What accounts for the successive failure of these efforts over the period studied? What do 
these outcomes suggest about the nature of planning in the post-political era?  
The following section of this paper reviews key debates around the new governing strategies 
adopted by neo-liberal states in a post-political era. Section three introduces the case study, briefly 
explaining how planning is structured in Sydney, and why planning reform has moved to centre stage 
in recent years. The following section offers a more detailed analysis of the planning reform process, 
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analysing how it attempted to redefine the basis for legitimacy, the purpose of the system, and the 
role of local democracy, in order to forge consensus.  The conclusion reflects on what this story tells 
us about the potential to resolve complex conflicts over development. The story suggests that while 
post-political strategies may seek to depoliticise difficult decisions, they may also stimulate a 
backlash that empowers new sorts of actors (at least temporarily). In an increasingly dynamic and 
permeable policy environment, the distribution of power is fluid, and consensus-building strategies 
have limited potential to co-opt opposition.      
New governance strategies and the post-political condition 
The governance strategies that have emerged in neo-liberal democracies over the past three 
decades have emphasised the role of permeable and fluid multi-level institutions incorporating 
public private partnerships, citizen participation, and civil society institutions in forums for 
collaboration, in place of hierarchical bureaucratic structures (Jessop 1998; Stoker 1998). In the 
absence of clear lines of authority, in a “fuzzier” (Stoker 1998) and more permeable policy 
environment, legitimacy becomes both more important and more difficult to establish.  Without 
legitimacy, governments are unlikely to succeed in orchestrating the multi-layered relationships, the 
collaborative decision making, and efficiency of outcomes that “good governance” requires. The 
delicate task of establishing and maintaining legitimacy hinges on the ability to “talk the language of 
social inclusion… [for] government [to] be open and accountable…raising the quality of local 
democracy” (Kearns and Paddison 2000, 848-9).  
Olsen (2006) argues that our understanding of legitimacy has been transformed with the emergence 
of the neo-liberal state, reflecting the different state-society relationship that envisions, mediated by 
deregulated and competitive provision of the services the public demands. Thus,  “[m]anagement by 
contract and result replaces management by command… Citizens are a collection of customers with 
a commercial rather than a political relationship to government, and legitimacy is based on 
substantive performance and cost efficiency and not on compliance with formal rules and 
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procedures” (Olsen 2006, 6). Pierre (2009) argues that this customer-service version of 
accountability (closely associated with stakeholder models of participation) is an unsatisfactory basis 
for the trust that underpins legitimacy. Thus, the shift away from clear bureaucratic lines of 
responsibility has undermined the quality of democracy (Olsen 2006; Pierre 2009).   
While claims to the openness and inclusiveness of networks appear to advance democracy, they may 
do the opposite (Peters and Pierre 2004). Informal decision fora are unlikely to challenge entrenched 
power relations, and rather than solving problems through collaborative decision making, networks 
may instead make it easier to exercise power, in the absence of bureaucratic controls to enforce due 
process and accountability (Olsen 2006; Swyngedouw 2005; Pierre 2009). Examining the U.K. 
Coalition government’s current planning reform agenda, Deas argues that “the potency of neo-
liberal consensus … limit[s] the scope for meaningful debate and genuine choice about the direction 
of policy” (Deas 2013, 79). The consensus that emerges from flexible and permeable decision making 
institutions may be illusory, masking conflict by imposing a solution favoured by more powerful 
actors, or one forged through pork barrel agreements (Peters and Pierre 2004). Thus,  
…democratic accountability … may be inimical to compromise-seeking which is necessary in 
differentiated and fragmented societies, and which may require negotiation behind closed 
doors. …”informalisation” strategies may be preferred by policy-makers to avoid public and 
media scrutiny (Papadopoulos 2010, 1032-1033).       
Close partnerships between government and industry also raise questions about collusion and 
corruption which are exacerbated by the opaque nature of “closed door” decision making. 
Permeable and apparently inclusive policy networks extending beyond government may also be 
actively used to legitimise decisions that states are unwilling to take full responsibility for 
(Swyngedouw 2005).  In a post-political era, the focus on consensus appears to privilege democracy 
through citizen participation. But as Allmendiger and Haughton (2012) argue,  
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…the resulting planning system is not so much an empowering arena for debating wide-
ranging societal options for future development, as a system focused on carefully stage-
managed processes…[that]…  gives the superficial appearance of engagement and 
legitimacy, whilst focusing on delivering growth expedited through some carefully 
choreographed processes for participation which minimise the potential for those with 
conflicting views to be given a meaningful hearing (Allmendiger and Haughton 2012, 90). 
Conflicts over planning, development, environmental, and other policy areas, suggest the 
elusiveness of consensus building efforts in practice. Inch examines the case of planning reform in 
England, arguing that rather than defusing conflict, post-political strategies displaced conflicts over 
economic growth to conflicts over NIMBYism (Inch 2012). Thus, “…the reform agenda can be 
interpreted as a search for a systemic fix that will eliminate conflict without disturbing the prevailing 
model of spatial development…covering over the underlying causes of conflict with fantasies of the 
consensus that a fit-for-purpose planning process will create” (Inch 2012, 532). In Allmendiger and 
Haughton’s view, the ‘new localism’ may represent merely a systemic correction within an evolving 
set of neo-liberal strategies aimed at sustaining a “market-enabling approach” (Allmendiger and 
Haughton 2013, 8) by maintaining legitimacy. England, in contrast to other European states, may go 
through more volatile ‘planning reform’ episodes in the effort to manage this delicate balance 
(Waterhout, Othengrafen and Sykes 2103).   
This paper explores how comparable neo-liberal processes in Australia have sought to manage this 
delicate balance in a spatially and temporally specific context, and reflects on the extent to which 
post-political strategies have effectively de-problematized the pursuit of development. The paper 
examines the case of the continuing process of planning reform in Sydney, NSW. The case offers 
further evidence (and some new perspectives) on the challenges states face in redefining democratic 
process through new models of participatory planning, in re-establishing legitimacy through a 
customer service model of “good governance,”  and in stage managing the consensus that is 
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necessary to streamline development and economic growth. The following section explains the 
context within which planning reform emerged as a continuous State strategy to resolve complex 
conflicts.  
Conflicts over Planning in Sydney 
In Australia, states have primary responsibility for land use and strategic spatial planning, but the 
NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act (EPAA) of 1979 delegated substantial powers to 
local governments. In principle, strategic metropolitan plans are implemented through local plans, 
which rezone land in order to accommodate the housing and jobs targets set at the metropolitan 
scale. But in practice, most local plans have articulated local preferences, retaining the low density 
footprint, open space, and small scale retail centres that characterise much of Sydney’s suburbs. The 
EPAA set explicit environmental protection goals to be weighed in considering development 
applications. It outlined a statutory process through which localities would prepare zoning plans to 
provide sufficient land for local shares of housing or jobs targets, and a process through which they 
would control developments of different types and levy the charges (exactions) needed to provide 
the infrastructure these necessitated (Farrier and Stein 2006). 
Over the past decade however, the State Planning agency and its Ministers have been engaged in a 
constant battle to control and direct local governments’ implementation of metropolitan strategies. 
The EPAA included extensive provisions for public involvement, rights of appeal through the Land 
and Environment Court, and an evaluative framework to guide decision making on development 
applications, with a heavy emphasis on environmental impacts (McFarland 2011). NSW’s planning 
legislation was a sophisticated and progressive document for its time, but is increasingly reviled as 
the source of the sclerosis attributed to the planning system (PIA 2011; UDIA 2012). Because of the 
Act’s focus on development assessment (and the labour intensive nature of that assessment), few 
localities have had the time or inclination to frame proactive plans to pursue a shared vision of the 
community’s future (with some notable exceptions, such as the City of Sydney’s Sydney 2030 
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Strategy: Green, Global, and Connected). Instead, local governments managed change through their 
effective veto power over development proposals. 
The development assessment process is further complicated by the powers that other State 
agencies (mining, infrastructure, environmental and heritage protection, and emergency services), 
have to undermine or contradict State metropolitan planning priorities by rejecting development 
applications.  Those agencies answer to different constituencies whose priorities are often sharply 
opposed to the priorities of the State Planning agency’s most identifiable client group, the property 
development sector. An array of State quasi-governmental agencies such as Urban Growth, the 
Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority, and privatised infrastructure providers such as Sydney Water, 
represent another layer of authority backed by the powers of land ownership and resources (Acuto 
2012). The public-private partnerships responsible for most new large scale infrastructure are driven 
by their own assessments of risk and return, and the projects those entities choose to fund (such as 
the Harbour Tunnel) are not necessarily those that strategic plans prioritise (Hodge 2004; 
Siemiatycki 2010; Toon and Falk 2003).  
At the local level, 43 local elected governments answer to their own well organised constituencies. 
Some are anxious to protect property values and quality of life from the densification and infill that 
State strategic priorities emphasise. Others are concerned with the investment potential of 
property, and are more accommodating to development. Lacking constitutional recognition, local 
elected governments may be dissolved by the State, and in some cases have been replaced by 
temporary appointed bodies more compliant to State agendas (Stillwell and Troy 2000; Punter 2005; 
Kubler 2007). Despite the constitutional (and financial) weakness of local governments, they are 
protected by a strong tradition of local democracy.  Popular democratic movements have played an 
important role in Sydney’s evolution, most notably in the “Green Bans” initiatives of the 1960s and 
1970s that joined construction labour unions with heritage advocates and low-income residents to 
oppose high-rise redevelopment and highway construction that would have decimated historic 
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neighbourhoods (Karskens 2009). More recently, vocal opposition has coalesced in groups such as 
“Save Our Suburbs,” aimed at resisting state efforts to impose higher density redevelopment targets 
on affluent suburbs (Ruming, Houston, and Amati 2012). The Better Planning Network, a coalition of 
more than 460 community groups, local governments, and environmental advocacy groups  
(http://betterplanningnetwork.good.do/nsw/pages/about-us/ ), emerged in response to the most 
recent round of planning reforms; it is discussed in more detail below.   
But much of the real business of urban development occurs outside the bureaucracy in a 
proliferating number of special purpose development authorities (Acuto 2012). For example, the 
Barangaroo Delivery Authority (BDA) was established to drive the redevelopment of the CBD’s last 
remaining harbourfront site, a 22 ha area vacated by Sydney Ports in the late 1990s. While the City 
Mayor sits on the Authority’s board, her voice is usually overwhelmed by those of the corporate and 
development interests that back the vision articulated in Richard Rodgers’ master plan for the site 
(Moore 2010). Concerns about a second casino, a 40 storey hotel tower jutting into the harbour, and 
the traffic impacts on an already overburdened city transport system have been over ridden, 
offering a classic example of how “consensus” can be imposed in fluid, permeable institutions that 
mask substantial differences in power (McKenney 2013a). However, opposition to the 
redevelopment plans has united elderly public housing tenants and affluent waterfront property 
owners of the adjacent City neighbourhood (Miller’s Point), with residents of the gentrified suburbs 
that overlook the site across the harbour (Barlass 2013). The contentious process of approving a 
second casino for Sydney has renewed conflicts between the City of Sydney and the State (McKenny 
2013a; Hasham 2013b; Nicholls 2013b).   
Metropolitan-wide conflicts have focused on the State’s failure to manage the region’s growth. A 
prolonged slowdown in residential development since the mid-2000s (despite continuing housing 
value appreciation and economic and population growth) dragged on until 2013, strengthening 
arguments that the complexity of regulation was responsible for stalling development (despite 
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ample evidence for a complex array of factors, including a spike in land prices and worldwide 
contraction in credit, as summarised by Hsieh, Norman and Orsmond 2012). Housing supply deficits 
estimated at approximately 89,000 homes have resulted in worsening affordability, with Sydney 
ranked fourth least affordable city, well below London and New York (but outdone by Vancouver, 
San Francisco, and Hong Kong) (Demographia 2013; National Housing Supply Council 2012, 25). 
Lagging public expenditure on infrastructure has exacerbated the effects of continued population 
growth and intensifying infill development (Engineers Australia 2011). A recent study by Price 
Waterhouse Coopers rates Sydney’s transportation and infrastructure worse than that of Mumbai, 
Beijing, or Istanbul, placing it fourth worst in a list of 27 “influential cities” studied (PWC 2012, 10). 
While the city ranks high on liveability, sustainability, and health and safety, business groups argue 
that Sydney’s longer term prospects as a competitive location for business investment are weakened 
by the increasingly high cost of doing business in NSW (Ferguson 2013).   
Developers claimed over-regulation and a lack of political will (“too much democracy”) deter the 
development that could grow Sydney out of its affordability crisis. Local residents claimed that 
planners, perceived increasingly as the agents of corrupt politicians, pursue densification without 
considering the capacity of a frayed and strained local infrastructure, or of fragile ecological systems. 
Politicians claimed that NIMBYism, bureaucratic sclerosis, developer intransigence, and the 
incompetence of other levels of governments, undermine the achievement of the housing targets 
and infrastructure investments needed to accommodate growth.   
Planning Reform 
The State’s initial response to this apparently intractable conflict was to introduce systemic reforms 
to simultaneously streamline development and depoliticise decision making, by centralising powers 
and introducing expert panels to take planning decisions in place of local Councillors (McFarland 
2011; Freestone and Williams 2012). The public backlash this precipitated (exacerbated by ongoing 
corruption scandals) contributed substantially to the electoral defeat of the incumbent Labor 
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government in 2011, and its replacement by a conservative coalition government that emphasised 
local autonomy and promised to roll back Ministerial powers to approve larger developments. This 
would be achieved through systemic reforms based on broad participation in a transparent process 
that would forge a sound consensus over how development should occur while protecting residents’ 
quality of life (NSW 2012, 3). This section sets the context for this process by briefly explaining the 
conflicts emerging from the first round of reforms, then examining the second round of reforms in 
more detail, focusing on three main sets of strategies: how to reshape local democracy, how to 
redefine the purpose of planning, and how to re-establish the State’s claims to legitimacy, in order 
to achieve consensus.  
First round planning reform (2005-2011) 
The first round of planning reforms responded to developers’ increasing dissatisfaction with a 
growth-limiting regime that had emphasised environmental protection and assigned a significant 
role to public participation. Writing in 2003, Pauline McGuirk describes a planning system 
“promoting the practice of consensus politics through increasing stakeholder and community 
participation in strategic policy making,”  using multi-level institutions  to achieve the “…state’s 
responsibility to mediate the tensions between the demands of accumulation and… the popular 
control of the state” (McGuirk 2003, 216). But behind this vision of a stable consensus were 
increasingly strident calls from developers for a streamlined and predictable planning process 
(delivering ‘accumulation’ more effectively), and equally strident opposition from community groups 
to metropolitan strategic priorities aimed at accelerating infill development to economise on new 
infrastructure investments and reduce Greenfield development. 
A succession of reforms introduced between 2005 and 2011 responded to this dilemma, through 
three sets of strategies – centralising economically significant development decisions, 
professionalising and standardising the development assessment process to offer greater 
predictability and reduce opportunity for local opposition, and privatising compliance certification to 
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speed up the process.  All three sets of strategies had significant impacts on the role of local 
democracy and the definition of legitimacy. Rather than depoliticising conflict and forging a 
consensus, they contributed to intensified conflict and concentrated opposition to the Labor 
government, contributing to its defeat in 2011. Dissatisfaction with Labor’s planning performance 
was exacerbated by a series of scandals related to land deals, in which the Minister for Planning was 
implicated (NSW ICAC 2011).   
Shifting development assessment responsibilities from local Councillors to the Minister for Planning, 
with much more limited potential for residents to oppose proposals, posed a significant challenge to 
local democracy. While in principle these powers were only applicable to large scale proposals of 
significance to adjacent local governments, the benchmark for consideration was set low enough (at 
AU$50m) to include most redevelopment projects. While the Minister was required to “consider” 
both public comments and environmental impact statements, he or she had considerable discretion, 
and could decide that economic (or other factors) outweighed local and environmental concerns 
(McFarland 2011). To reduce the potential for arbitrary decisions, the independent Planning 
Assessment Commission was established in 2008 to advise the Minister. Decisions could also be 
referred to expert panels (Joint Regional Planning Panels) that offered “depoliticised” decision 
forums insulated from local politics, and from the potential for corruption. Local government’s 
autonomy was further reduced by standardising the zoning and local planning framework, and by 
capping development levies (O’Flynn 2011).  Some (very limited) categories of development were 
exempted from detailed review and public comment during this round of reforms (Park 2010). 
Building code enforcement and development certification were privatised, to speed up the 
development process which had become bogged down in administrative delays in some Councils. 
“Name and shame” lists were published of the average periods Councils took to assess development 
applications.    
13 
 
But the outcomes of these efforts were patchy. Some proved quite disastrous, with substantial 
evidence that private code enforcement had resulted in a sharp deterioration of building standards 
(Building Professionals Board v Cohen (No 2) [2010] NSWADT 266; Dix v Building Professionals Board 
[2010] NSWADT 160). Public opposition to the centralisation of development authority under the 
State was reinforced by the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) finding that the 
legislation (Part 3A) entailed a substantial potential for corruption, even if no actual decisions had 
been found to be corrupt (NSW ICAC 2010). The Commission pointed to three key issues –  
•  “…the existence of a wide discretion to approve projects that are contrary to local plans and 
do not necessarily conform to state strategic plans creates a corruption risk and a community 
perception of a lack of appropriate boundaries” (NSW ICAC 2010, 9) 
• the complexity and length of time to approval, which “…also increases the likelihood that 
applicants will feel it necessary to engage lobbyists, and contributes to perceptions of undue 
influence by lobbyists,” (NSW ICAC 2010, 9) and  
• the use of the major projects approvals process as a “shortcut to rezoning,” enabling 
developers to take advantage of delays in finalising local plans to obtain approval for developments 
that would not be approved under proposed plans (NSW ICAC 2010, 10).  
Several high profile scandals around politicians’ role in development decisions, exacerbated the 
appearance that Planning Ministers were likely to use their wide discretion to approve 
developments that would violate environmental and other local quality of life protections (NSW 
ICAC 2011). Public land scandals further undermined not just the Labor party’s, but also the State’s, 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public.   
Joint Regional Planning Panels did little to allay discontent with the politicisation of decision making, 
given that their composition (three State appointees and two Council appointees) appeared to 
ensure that State, rather than local, priorities would prevail. Critics pointed out that unelected JRPPs 
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assumed the decision making powers of elected Councils (Mant 2009; Piracha 2010; McFarland 
2011). Local governments responded to blanket caps on development levies by slowing approvals or 
rejecting development applications, arguing they were unable to provide adequate infrastructure 
(IPART 2012, 15). The improved accountability intended by publishing Councils’ development 
approval times, had the perverse (but predictable) consequence of some councils refusing to accept 
development applications if they were judged incomplete, to avoid the additional time involved in 
requesting further information (PIA 2010, 3).  
Meanwhile, developers and industry groups continued to complain that a complex and 
unpredictable regulatory regime was making it increasingly impossible to develop in the state. The 
Property Council of Australia argued that despite some progress, significant problems persisted with 
“…the assessment process and its handling by local government, although the interaction of state 
agencies with this process was also a concern” (PCA 2010, 17). The solution, the Urban Development 
Institute of Australia (UDIA) argued, was to  “… streamline[d] decision making on the merits of a 
proposal and its consistency with broader strategic planning documents (such as the Regional and 
Metropolitan Strategies) rather than promote the detailed assessment of the potential impacts” 
(UDIA 2010, 3). The Planning Institute of Australia framed the problem as one inherent in “the 
culture of planning,” pointing to an entrenched anti-development stance not only among residents 
but also within the ranks of local government planners (PIA 2012).  
Efforts to solve the development-democracy impasse by asserting State control and undermining the 
local democratic process exacerbated rather than depoliticised conflict. Consensus had not been a 
significant goal of this first round of reforms: but without consensus, systemic reform would clearly 
fail. Public trust had been alienated, and the legitimacy of the State government undermined (a 
situation worsened by a series of corruption scandals involving the Minister for Planning and other 
senior Labor Party members). Developers were intensely critical of the failure to streamline what 
continued to be a cumbersome bureaucratic process involving considerable public input, outside of a 
15 
 
few high profile developments insulated from public scrutiny. The opposition platform claimed both 
planning reform and local government empowerment as its priorities.  
 A new era of reform?  
Planning reform was thus a key issue in the 2011 state election, with the incoming Liberal-National 
Coalition government initiating an independent review of the planning legislation and promising 
system-wide revisions to the planning process. One of the new government’s first initiatives was to 
revise the unpopular Part 3A process, expanding the role of the independent Planning Assessment 
Commission to take responsibility for decisions about development applications involving a political 
donor, where Councils opposed the project, or where considerable opposing submissions had been 
received. While this addressed some of the key concerns raised with Ministerial discretion, the PAC’s 
objectivity has itself been suspect (MKenny 2014).   
More fundamental reforms were clearly needed. An extensive two year consultation process sought 
to bring the sharply opposed factions together in a broad based group including developers, 
community groups, local governments, and industry representatives. The new government’s stated 
intention was that a broad based and open process was needed to forge the consensus for 
fundamental reform that would depoliticise the process and provide greater “transparency” and 
“certainty” to developers, while empowering local government (NSW 2012, 3).   
Reforms sought to rebuild trust and re-establish legitimacy, but they did so by redefining legitimacy 
according to a much narrower customer-service-based concept. Reforms also aimed to streamline 
and professionalise the development approval process, but to do so they had to simplify decision 
criteria to emphasise the primacy of economic growth. Most dramatically, the reforms sought to 
redefine the nature and role of local democracy, substantially reducing participation at the point of 
development assessment but expanding requirements for participation in strategic and sub-regional 
planning. The proposed expansion of the category of “code-complying development” was a 
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particularly contentious instrument for this, aiming to insulate 80 percent of development 
applications from public scrutiny and legal challenge. Each of these aims is examined in more detail 
below.  
1: Redefining legitimacy. The centrepiece of the State’s claim to re-establish legitimacy was that 
development decisions would now be guided by evidence-based strategic planning at the local, sub-
regional, and metropolitan scales (NSW 2013, 63). “Decision making under the new system will be 
transparent and accessible,” (NSW 2013, 15), based on ePlanning forecasts of future needs, and in 
particular ensuring that planning decisions reflected an understanding of “market conditions.” Re-
scaling plan making in this way (and asserting a clear hierarchy of plans, with each level required to 
demonstrate how the targets of higher level plans would be met) would ensure that narrow local 
interests would have to be moderated by considering broader public interests in economic growth. 
Thus, the legitimacy claimed by local politicians as representatives of their constituents’ interests, 
would be outweighed (in principle) by the legitimacy the State could claim as the representative of a 
more broadly defined “public interest”.  
The Independent Commission Review with which the process began concluded that “… public 
confidence in the system has been eroded by the perception that politics can determine decision-
making, and a lack of community confidence in the integrity of the planning system over decisions 
about larger developments” (NSW 2013, 13).  Legitimacy would also be re-established by introducing 
clear accountability standards, with performance reporting required at all levels of government. The 
culture change that would transform this historical distrust was one that “… will promote 
cooperation and participation, the delivery of positive and pragmatic outcomes and … an outcome 
focussed, problem solving attitude. Regular and mandatory performance reporting for strategic 
planning at all levels will also support the transition to greater transparency and accountability” 
(NSW 2013, 34). 
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Local government would have clear performance benchmarks (which the State would enforce 
through its constitutional authority over localities). Although State government too would be held to 
similar performance standards it would not be overseen by a similar higher level authority, given the 
Commonwealth government’s very limited role in land use planning.  Public trust would be rebuilt by 
a customer-service approach to rating government performance. The taint of corruption that had 
undermined support for the previous government’s exercise of centralised authority would be 
eliminated by this new transparency, and by an expanded role for expert panels. 
2: Redefining sustainability. Reforms aimed to replace NSW’s complex planning process with one 
that would be simpler and more predictable. In place of the environmental protection goals framed 
in the existing legislative guidelines for evaluating development proposals (Farrier and Stein 2006), 
the proposed reforms asserted a new hierarchy of decision criteria: “[t]he main purpose of the 
planning system is to promote economic growth and development in NSW for the benefit of the 
entire community, while protecting the environment and enhancing people’s way of life” (NSW 
Department of Planning and Infrastructure 2013, 14). Planning reform was justified as a necessary 
strategy to resolve the State’s failures in delivering housing growth, economic productivity and job 
growth, and to control the cost of living (NSW Department of Planning and Infrastructure 2013, 13). 
Reforms proposed to dispense with multiple agency approvals for most development applications, 
and establish a “one stop shop” for the remainder – a benign sounding customer-service 
improvement. Similarly, expert panels would be used more widely to ensure politics no longer 
undermined the predictability of decision making on which efficient development relied. Expert 
panels would apply the new simplified decision criteria impartially, informed by sound evidence, 
ensuring a streamlined process stripped of local political activism around environmental protection, 
quality of life, and opposition to densification.   
3: Redefining Democracy. The most immediately contentious aspect of the reforms was the 
proposal to change the timing and scale of citizen participation in development decisions. The 
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reforms proposed that most development would be assessed administratively (by expanding the 
scope of ‘code-complying’ development); residents would have no opportunity to comment on any 
but the most contentious developments. The proposals encourage participation at the local and sub-
regional strategic planning stage, where plans would be formulated to deliver on the objectives and 
targets of metropolitan plans. Given the limited potential of residents to influence the higher order 
plans, this represents tokenism rather than empowerment. While residents were promised a 
Community Participation Charter, they would lose significant legal rights of due process: 
development opponents would be able to appeal only a limited range of decisions in court (on 
procedural rather than merit grounds), while unsuccessful development proponents would have a 
streamlined and low cost appeals process.   
A significant element of the ‘cultural change’ claimed for the proposals appears to be a reduction in 
local democracy; the limitations on participation, combined with the reduced authority and 
autonomy of local elected governments, transforms the political context within which planning and 
development decisions are made, to one where expert panels, rather than elected Councillors, have 
the most powerful voice. The priority assigned to economic growth (with the ritual but subsidiary 
acknowledgement of the need to minimise environmental and social impacts) clearly situates the 
systemic reforms in response to the interests of the property development industry in streamlining 
development, rather than the (sometimes narrowly focused and self-regarding) interests of 
residents in liveability and environmental quality.   
Consensus and dissent 
Managing this attempt to forge consensus around “achieving change in the culture of planning” 
proved impossible. At a stakeholder workshop held to present the initial Liberal-National Coalition 
reform recommendations, the debate on the reforms was deflected by attacks on the process:  
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'We are concerned that the community and the environment are being cut out of the new 
legislation … [i]t is ironic that a Government claiming to champion community participation 
restricted community representation to 7% of this important workshop. We are also 
concerned that the issues discussed at the workshop were very much those selected by the 
organisers. There was no opportunity to raise and discuss other aspects of the planning 
reforms that are important to the community’ (Better Planning Network 2012).  
Community groups claimed that ‘consultation’ over reform represented merely a new form of 
collusion between developers and the State government (Better Planning Network 2013a). More 
than 2000 submissions on the proposed reforms offer a rich source of evidence for how the conflicts 
were articulated. The summary presented below (Table 1) is based on a purposive sample of 
submissions from key stakeholders (developers, industry, local governments, state agencies, and 
professional associations). Other studies have examined a broader cross-section of submissions, the 
bulk of which came from individuals (NSW Department and Planning and Infrastructure, 2013b; 
Hamm, 2013).  
[Table 1 here] 
There is little evidence on either side that the reforms (or the process) successfully legitimised State 
proposals to streamline planning. Opponents of the Bill (including an assortment of local 
governments, state agencies, and professional associations) focused their comments on the 
hollowness of claims to evidence-based planning, and the lack of essential checks and balances on 
executive power. Supporters (broadly, developer and industry groups) expressed concerns about the 
continued limitations on executive power, and the resulting “lack of policy certainty” that would 
continue to constrain the State’s growth. Further anxieties about the State’s ability to lead cultural 
change are expressed in recommendations to tie performance metrics to explicit punishment and 
reward,  that would (clearly) further erode any legitimacy the State might claim for itself as a 
defender of local autonomy.  
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There is also little evidence that the reform process forged any consensus around a new vision of the 
‘public interest’ in ‘sustainable development.’ Both opponents and supporters point to the lack of 
clarity in the redefined aims of the planning system, and agree that it would be likely to decrease 
certainty and increase court challenges. Rationalising decision making through centralising executive 
authority raised questions about not just probity, but also the quality of analysis that would inform 
defensible and transparent decisions, both in the “one-stop shop” of state approvals, and in the 
expert panels. The abandonment of detailed assessments of development impacts by specialist 
regulatory agencies, reform opponents argued, would weaken the evidence base for decisions. The 
appointment of individual experts to panels would not adequately substitute for the role these 
agencies played in ensuring a consistent, institutional approach to important public concerns.    
Finally, the proposals clearly failed to forge any consensus around a new vision of democracy. 
Supporters argued the provisions did not go far enough to require (or oblige) citizens to accept the 
primacy of growth over ‘narrow self-interest’ (Hasham 2013). Opponents pointed to the dramatic 
reduction in due process, and the Better Planning Network used these limitations on appeal rights as 
a banner to mobilise an ever-wider range of allies (BPN 2013b). Local governments too used the 
issue to illustrate how the legislation would re-write their powers.      
Faced with increasingly vocal opposition and coordinated lobbying, the Minister retreated on some 
points, reinstating the right of appeal against development approvals, and limiting the contentious 
use of “code complying” development to new growth centres, and to what were designated “urban 
activation precincts,” infill locations suitable for increased densities (NSW Department of Planning 
and Infrastructure 2013a). Developers protested that the reforms were now toothless, and that the 
reform process had been undermined by self-interested residents (Hasham 2013a; Jewell 2013).  
But even these watered down proposals failed. Responding to the vocal Better Planning Network 
alliance, three parties in the Upper House of the State Parliament (Labor, the Greens, and the 
Shooters and Fishers Party) allied to amend the bill to remove any provision for the streamlined 
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consideration of code-complying development, forcing the Minister to retract the legislation and 
humiliating the Coalition government (Nicholls 2013a; Better Planning Network 2013a). After some 
months of attempts to broker a compromise, the Coalition government abandoned attempts at 
legislative change, arguing instead that “the government would ‘look after the people of NSW by 
continuing to reform the current planning process through existing laws” (Hasham 2014). 
Administrative redefinition of the types of development covered by the “exempt and complying” 
category introduced in the pre-2011 round of reforms would accomplish the streamlining around 
which the participatory process had failed to forge agreement. Ministerial discretion would be used 
to offer the predictability and certainty developers claimed as essential for economic growth.   
This is clearly not a partisan issue (although it offers a rich forum for party political posturing): the 
government advocating the proposals came to power based on intense dissatisfaction with the 
previous government’s efforts to centralise control and streamline the development process. But 
this outcome represents a substantial failure to depoliticise the development and planning process. 
Delivering consensus-based planning reform, and protecting the rights of local government, were 
key points in the coalition platform. Between 2005 and 2013, neither party has managed to move 
the state forward from local development control by veto. Development industry lobbying groups 
have described the impasse as “a disaster” (Hasham 2013a). Clearly, the State of NSW has failed to 
mediate the tensions between “the demands of accumulation” (McGuirk 2003), and a revitalized 
populist movement. 
A two year participatory process aimed to build consensus for the fundamental reforms the 
development industry demanded. This appeared as if it would be a relatively straightforward story 
about a powerful developer lobby (backed by a revenue-hungry State government) capturing a 
nominally collaborative process in order to streamline and simplify development for its own benefit. 
Claims to transparency, to ensuring a voice for all stakeholders, and a substantial public investment 
in consultants, marketing, and events, were intended to demonstrate the new State government’s 
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commitment to re-establish legitimacy. But the trust that had been lost during the first round of 
planning reform diminished further. The widely held perception that “reform” was primarily 
intended to benefit developers was further confirmed when the draft proposals included significant 
erosions in democratic process (and both bureaucratic and legal protections of due process). The 
backlash forged an unexpectedly powerful alliance among a wide range of community and local 
government groups, who were able to derail both the government’s agenda and the reform process.  
One of their central aims was to re-entrench bureaucratic process – the cumbersome and time 
consuming development assessment and approval process that ensures local residents have an 
effective veto over development they oppose.  
Conclusions 
The story of planning reform efforts in Sydney raises an interesting set of questions about the nature 
of the post-political era in planning, and the likelihood that states will be able to forge consensus, 
and stage-manage agreement to defuse conflict (Allmendiger and Haughton 2011; Swyngedouw 
2007). New South Wales encountered three main sets of problems in this attempt.  
First, the State’s claim to establish “open transparent processes” in order to “change the culture of 
planning,” was undermined by its failure to explicitly address questions of who the stakeholders 
were, and what was on the reform agenda. In practice, the reform effort aimed to treat resident 
organisations as just one among many stakeholder groups, alongside developers, financiers, 
employers, planners, infrastructure providers, and local governments. Defining stakeholders in this 
way implicitly supported the State’s argument that narrowly local interests undermined the 
development and associated economic growth that was in some broader “public interest.” As Pierre 
(2009) argues, the construction of participants as “stakeholders” also emphasised a client-like 
business relationship rather than a voter-based political relationship.   
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Second, the reform agenda exacerbated the problem by focusing on a particular construction of ‘the 
public interest,’ as identical with economic growth. A new definition of ‘sustainable development’ as 
a primarily economic goal, with subsidiary considerations of environmental and social factors, 
became a lightning rod for conflict over planning reform. This was an agenda within which only some 
sort of answers (how to enable economic growth) would make sense, a classic example of a post-
political strategy (Deas 2013, 79). Reform supporters also rejected this formulation, pointing to its 
lack of clarity and its vulnerability to legal challenges.  
Third, the effort to use public forums with invited stakeholders to define what was wrong with the 
planning system and how it could be fixed, resulted not in an effective manufacturing of consensus 
by the imposition of the powerful voices of the development industry and its allies, but in a sudden 
redistribution of power. Framing their alliance in the (de-politicised) language of ‘Better Planning,’ 
an apparently weak and marginalised group of resident organisations, environmental advocates, and 
local government groups, gained substantial credibility through a well-coordinated social and 
conventional media campaign. In the process, State expectations about stage-managing or 
choreographing agreement were disappointed, highlighting the fluid and unpredictable nature of 
political power. The well-connected development industry alliance, which might have been expected 
to effectively deploy the rhetoric of the need to guarantee continued economic growth as a 
rationale for cutting back local democratic process (devalued as NIMBYism), lost this battle. Instead, 
the Better Planning Network alliance turned the State’s efforts to restrict resident involvement in 
development decisions, and to redefine the aims of planning, to its own advantage. The BPN 
effectively framed the threat of the apparent priority the reforms assigned to developers’ interests, 
in order to coalesce opposition around its own platform. The limitations of the State’s efforts to re-
establish legitimacy, to redefine a more limited local democracy, and to assert economic growth as 
the purpose of planning, were easily exploited organising points (BPN 2013a; 2013b).  
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There may be nothing inevitable about this outcome; had Sydney been at a different point in the 
economic cycle, with more visible unemployment, greater recognition of spatial inequality, and 
more fragile growth potential, the BPN may not have succeeded in mobilising the wide range of 
groups it did.  Conflicts around mining expansion on the metropolitan periphery also likely increased 
the intensity of opposition to prioritising economic return over environmental safety. Nevertheless, 
this story suggests that post-political governing strategies may be particularly vulnerable to precisely 
such shifts in the balance of political power. A cynical and distrusting public may be more easily 
organised around alternative configurations of conflicts; it may be far easier to choreograph 
opposition than support.  
The broader question raised by this story is whether we are in a post-political era where states can 
effectively defuse conflicts and forge consensus around a rhetoric of growth, or instead in an era of 
increasing un-governability, where states are decreasingly able to manage diffuse processes and 
negotiate any sort of consensus. New efforts to establish permeable, flexible governing strategies to 
do more with less may be worse (or no better) at defusing political conflict than traditionally 
bureaucratic institutions relying on command and control, within a broader framework of 
representative democracy and accountability. Redefining the basis for the State government’s 
legitimacy around expert voices and performance metrics did little to re-establish the trust needed 
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Table 1: Summary of Issues and Responses 




“Concerns about a lack of policy 
certainty …have become startlingly 
evident as the PAC and Land and 
Environment Court have made a 
number of decisions in contradiction 
of the recommendations of the 
Department of Planning and 
Infrastructure” (NSW Minerals Council 
2013, 5) 
 “[T]he breadth of the Ministerial discretions raises 
legitimate concerns in terms of perceptions of 
probity…” (Law Society of NSW 2013, 4) 
 
 “Statutory safeguards for transparency and 
probity are needed, given the extent of 
discretionary decision-making to be granted to the 
Minister and the possible financial benefits gained 
by those inappropriately exploiting privileged 
information about such decisions” (City of Sydney 
2013, 9) 
 
“…expert members serving on panels should only 
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do so on a ‘pool’ or rotational basis, to avoid the 
potential for regulatory ‘capture’ in favour of 
frequent applicants or adverse bias against 
frequent applicants” (PIA NSW 2013, 25) 
One stop shop “To deliver an integrated whole of 
government strategic planning 
system, the Act must be given primacy 
above all other legislation impacting 
or relating to the planning system” 
(PCA 2013, 26) 
 
“To deliver state significant 
infrastructure and projects of regional 
significance, the ‘One Stop Shop’ for 
concurrences requires statutory 
authority in decision-making 
processes” (PCA 2013, 37) 
“Under the draft Bill the Minister stands in the 
shoes of the relevant authority. …what certainty is 
there that the Minister …will have the necessary 
expertise in the relevant area (heritage, water 
management etc.) to adequately and properly fulfil 
the requirements of the relevant authority under 
the relevant Act?” (PIA NSW 2013, 23) 
 
“The proposed replacement of the Office of 
Environment and Heritage’s (OEH) role …through a 
proposed ‘one stop shop’ referral for concurrences 
and approvals, by a non expert bureaucracy within 
the Department of Planning, is a serious threat to 




“decision making is prone to being 
heavily politicised and does not 
promote transparency or good 
planning outcomes. This has created 
uncertainty and angst for the 
community and industry in particular. 
UDIA NSW believes that robust 
strategic planning based on clear and 
readily available information, which 
also incorporates upfront community 
consultation, will help achieve better 
planning outcomes” (UDIA 2013, 9) 
“[The draft Bill]… gives public authorities discretion 
to withhold from public inspection any part of an 
EIS whose publication would be contrary to the 
public interest. Guidelines on the exercise of this 
discretion should be provided and the 
circumstances in which it is used closely 
constrained to ensure the principles of the Charter 
are respected… This is also important for 
transparency and information availability online 
(ePlanning)” (PIA NSW 2013, 13) 
 
“Hazard information must be updated at intervals 
according to the nature of the hazard and risks, 
made publicly available and incorporated into 
Strategic Plans as soon as practicable thereafter” 
(SSCG 2013, 5) 
 
“The incompleteness of heritage schedules of local 
environmental plans and the State Heritage 
Register has significant implications for 
development assessment and strategic planning in 
the new planning system. Resources must be 
committed to establish the “evidence” base that 
will underpin the strategic plans in the new 




The proposed composition of 
Subregional Planning Boards means 
that all councils will have a seat at the 
table – out-numbering state-
appointed or independent chairs. This 
risks unbalanced representation” (PCA 
2013, 33) 
 
“…the Boards outlined in the White 
Paper seem overly weighted with 
government representation, with no 
mention of industry, community or 
“…the concept of a ‘partnership’ needs to be more 
than just words – it must be reflected in the 
processes and frameworks in the new planning 
system and become embedded in the new culture. 
It is also important that the NSW Government 
recognise that Local Government is an elected 
autonomous sphere of government and not an 
agency of the NSW Government” (LGNSW 2013, 5) 
 
“…the system is designed to deliver the State 
government’s priorities, not those of the local 
community. Far from ‘depoliticising’ the system, it 
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business involvement”(UDIA 2013, 6) appears to be more open to political interference 
than ever from State politicians” (SSROC 2013, 6)  
Performance 
metrics 
“Performance monitoring must also 
include a system that will reward 
excellent performance and penalise 
underperformance. There must be 
clear repercussions for 
underperforming planning 
authorities” (Urban Taskforce 2013, 7) 
“…the development industry also needs cultural 
change and needs to perform better in terms of 
the quality of development applications” (LGNSW 
2013, 6). 
 
“Performance monitoring of the planning system 
should include qualitative measures such as 





“Reinforcement of the primacy of 
depoliticised development 
assessment is a stand out feature of 
the draft legislation. 
It confirms that independent decision-
making can: 
• give the community comfort in the 
integrity of decisions 
• provide investors with confidence in 
the objectivity of assessments, and 
• reduce the angst which has recently 
riddled the system” (PCA 2013, 38) 
“Cooperation implies equal power, which is not the 
case: Councils will not have control of very much, 
and will be required to ‘cooperate’ in the delivery 
of decisions with which they do not agree. This is 
not cooperation but obedience.” (SSROC 2013, 5) 
 
“[T] broad Ministerial discretions proposed… allow 
the Minister to make plans overriding local and 
subregional plans…without any requirement for 
the Minister to consult and no requirement for the 
Minister to have regard to the relevant strategic 




“The community must be educated 
about the planning system and the 
necessity to balance personal 
aspirations with overall community 
good” (UDIA 2013, 4) 
 
“The more detailed local community 
participation plans must: 
• acknowledge that growth must be 
provided for. 
• clearly state that the community has 
a responsibility to accept growth and 
make provision for the growth. 
• must acknowledge that the 
landowner has rights to develop land” 
(Urban Taskforce 2013, 8) 
 
“Ensure community participation 
plans and processes also place an 
obligation of participants to work 
towards pre-agreed outputs. 
…Caveats around rational 
involvement are needed to manage 
expectations. Community 
participation must be proportionate” 
(PCA 2013, 30) 
[The draft Bill]…significantly restricts the ability of 
the community to challenge plans and some 
decisions even in the case of legal error” (Law 
Society of NSW 2013, 2) 
 
“This disconnect is also apparent in such 
fundamental areas as community participation, 
strategic plans and State significant development 
approvals where significant rights of review have 
been removed…” (Law Society of NSW 2013, 6) 
 
“The limited availability of third-party appeal rights 
…means that an important disincentive for corrupt 
decision-making is absent” (ICAC 2013, 4) 
Redefining the 
public interest 
“Under the draft legislation, a clear 
definition of ‘sustainable 
development’ is absent. …The lack of 
a definition of ‘sustainable 
development’ removes certainty and 
this would arguably increase the 
potential for disputes” (PCA 2013, 26-
27) 
“The concepts of sustainability, sustainable growth 
and sustainable development are undefined which 
creates uncertainty, lack of consistency and can 
lead to disputes, ultimately leaving it to the courts 
to interpret” (SCCG 2013, 14) 
 
“the requirement for consideration during a merit 




“If criteria for public interest 
assessment is to be developed, we 
recommend the criteria and 
underlying definitions are carefully 
devised and assessed in concert with 
industry for a balanced 
approach”(PCA 2013, 41) 
 
“The Planning System Review 
provides the opportunity to ensure 
that NSW is able to attract investment 
in the major projects that are 
significant to the State’s economy and 
generate jobs, investment that flows 
through to the broader business 
community and direct revenue to 
government” (NSW Minerals Council 
2013, 1) 
inclusion of the words ‘in particular whether any 
public benefit outweighs any adverse impact of the 
development’…intergenerational equity, the 
precautionary principle and other environmental 
benefits will be outweighed by perceived public 
benefit in economic and social terms” (Law Society 
of NSW 2013, 9) 
 
“A system that does not provide one clear rational 
choice for development determinations will create 
inconsistency. Corrupt conduct can also be difficult 
to prove where any number of possible outcomes 
can be justified…” (ICAC 2013, 1) 
   
Source: Author’s analysis of selected Submissions to the NSW Planning Reform White Paper and Draft Bills.  
 
                                                          
i The phrase “fantasies of consensus” is used by Andy Inch (2012, 532).  
